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Abstract 
 
We estimate short- and long-run elasticities of private consumption for fiscal instruments, using 
a Fixed Effects model for the 19-euro area countries during the period of 1960-2017, to assess 
how fiscal elasticities vary during fiscal episodes. According to the results, positive “tax 
revenue” elasticities indicate that consumers have a Ricardian behaviour, whereby they 
perceive an increase in taxation to be a sign of future government spending. “Social benefits” 
appear to have a non-keynesian effect on private consumption. In addition, using a narrative 
approach to identify fiscal consolidations, it is seen that private consumption continues to 
exhibit a non-keynesian response to tax increases, both in the short and long-run, and “other 
expenditures” have a recessive impact during “normal times”. Furthermore, “social benefits” 
are more contractionary in consolidations than in both expansions and “normal times”. 
Additionally, after the launch of the EMU, expansionary fiscal consolidations became harder 
to observe, and “other expenditure” and “investment” lost their non-keynesian role. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last decade, European countries implemented a large fiscal consolidation to 
reduce their budget deficits and government debt ratios. However, in several cases, the 
empirical evidence seems to contradict the theoretical predictions, where fiscal consolidations 
are followed by an increase in output. During the same period, there were also episodes where 
the symmetric effect occurred, i.e., in spite of stimulating the same GDP components, fiscal 
expansions led to recessive results. The literature labels such episodes as Non-Keynesian Effects 
of Fiscal Policy (NKEFP), despite the inexistence of either a consensus regarding the existence 
of a crowding in, or a crowding out effect induced by public expenditure, or the non-linearity 
of the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policy. 
The non-keynesian effects of fiscal policy - more precisely the expansionary fiscal 
consolidations, have encouraged research about the effectiveness of fiscal policy during the last 
few years, following the external interventions that occurred in the Eurozone, after the Global 
and Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009, which notably involved fairly demanding fiscal 
adjustments. In this context, our aim is to specifically revisit which fiscal instruments may have 
a non-keynesian effect on private consumption during fiscal episodes. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 
methodologically identifies the discretionary fiscal episodes and the identification method. 
Section 4 presents the methodology, data, and the empirical assessment and, lastly, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Keynesian Effects 
Developed in the context of the Great Depression, the Keynesian theory focuses on the 
relevance of expenditure in the economy and in aggregate demand, namely its effects on 
inflation and output. In the Keynesian perspective, fiscal policy has an effective impact on 
aggregate demand (especially on national consumption and income) which passes through 
spillover effects (Bernheim, 1989). In order to advocate the stabilising function of fiscal policy, 
which emphasises the need for government intervention, this theory suggests that the size of 
government spending together with the tax burden should vary according to the business cycle, 
namely through the application of automatic stabilizers (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012).  
Following this approach, and by increasing government expenditure, the Government can 
have the ability to stimulate the labour market, induce private consumption, and encourage 
private investment. The theory assumes that a certain share of economic resources is not used, 
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and that a proportion of the population is liquidity constrained or economically myopic, having 
a higher propensity to consume and respond quicker to an income shock (Brinca et al., 2016). 
On the other hand, a fiscal adjustment (in the form of tax increases or cuts in public 
expenditure) would be expected to generate a temporary negative impact on aggregate demand, 
and consequently, on GDP. However, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the best 
instruments that should be used to implement a fiscal consolidation with the least possible 
economic cost. For instance, some authors, such as Afonso and Leal (2019), argue that 
government spending has a higher multiplier than that of increasing taxes, whilst Barrel et al. 
(2012) defend that multipliers generated by income taxes and benefits adjustments are small, 
as they can be offset by a temporary change in savings rate. Other authors, such as Alesina et 
al. (2017) defend that cuts in government spending and transfers seem to be less recessive than 
tax-based consolidations. In addition, Alesina et al. (2018) argue that spending cuts not only 
usually have a very small output cost, but they might even be expansionary in some cases. 
Several studies2 defend that fiscal impacts on output are substantially larger during 
recessions than during expansionary phases, as is the impact on total employment. Furthermore, 
such an effect might be even higher should the spending shock be simultaneous with an 
economic recovery, despite the fact that this shock might generate deflationary responses during 
downturns (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2011).  
The level of government debt also plays a role in the multiplier effect of fiscal policy, due 
to the fact that the output response to a fiscal shock might not be statistically different from zero 
in countries with high debt ratios (say, above 60% of GDP). Accordingly, such a fiscal stimulus 
could have a neutral, or even negative impact on long-run output (Ilzetski et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, it seems relevant to highlight the fact that budget rigidities can constrain the 
ability of policy makers to properly implement fiscal policies, thus conditioning the size and 
structure of government budgets. According to Muñoz and Olaberria (2019), high shares of 
rigid spending in a budget contribute to the onset of fiscal distress. For instance, high 
expenditure on pensions reduces the probability of a fiscal consolidation, especially in countries 
with a lower level of institutional quality. 
 
Non-Keynesian Effects 
The effects behind the so-called non-keynesian episodes are usually divided into those 
which are linked with the consumption channel, and those which are linked with the investment 
                                                             
2 See, for example, Afonso and Leal (2019) or Stockhammer et al. (2016). 
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channel. With regards to the consumption channel, in other words, the hypothesis that a fiscal 
consolidation can increase private consumption, non-keynesian episodes occur due to 
expectations, wealth, and substitution effects. 
The expectations effect occurs when there is an improvement in the expectation of 
consumers regarding future tax liabilities, which can lead to a reduction in precautionary 
savings (Feldstein, 1982) and also to an increase in the present discounted value of disposable 
income, which stimulates private consumption. The opposite also occurs when facing a 
deterioration of expectations, following the rationale behind the Ricardian theory. 
Regarding the wealth effect, a fall in interest rates, together with an increase in assets’ 
market value and the opportunity cost of savings, all lead to households increasing their day-
to-day consumption (McDermott and Wescott, 1996).  
The substitution effect consists of the substitution of public consumption by private 
consumption. Under this perspective, a cut in government expenditure frees up more economic 
resources (such as the labour force) and increases the market space, creating room for the 
private sector to expand (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990).  
However, it is important to highlight that a fiscal consolidation can only stimulate private 
consumption if the impact is large enough to offset the direct effect on disposable income. In 
addition, should the reduction in public expenditure be small and temporary, then private 
consumption may not create an expansionist effect, due to a change in households’ expectations 
regarding future budget deficits and debt dynamics (Afonso, 2001). 
As argued by Barro (1974), with regards to inter-generational redistribution, the financing 
of bonds issued by present generations will be paid by the issue of new bonds, or through 
increases in the tax burden on future generations, thus compromising these generations’ 
welfare.  
Moving on to the investment channel, a fiscal consolidation can be expected to lead to an 
increase in private investment (Alesina et al, 1998). According to the literature, this investment 
can become the main source of expansionary consolidations, and it is one of the largest subjects 
for discussion regarding this issue. The first inherent effect is that of interest rates, which 
consists of a sort of “credibility effect”, which assumes that a decrease in government budget 
deficits is followed by a decrease in the real interest rate, due to a fall in the risk default 
premium3 (Alesina et al., 1998). This reduction consequently leads to a boost in aggregate 
                                                             
3 According to Barbosa and Costa (2010), the risk premium depends on each issuer's idiosyncratic factors and 
corresponds to the return required by investors to offset the risk that future cash flows could be different from 
those agreed, due to the occurrence of a default. 
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demand through private demand and generate incentives for private investment. Another 
situation where the interest rate effect can be observed is when there is a decrease of pressure 
from capital markets, as with lower budget deficits, governments have less financing needs. 
The second inherent effect is on the labour market. Under certain conditions, fiscal 
consolidations can induce a wage moderation, which consequently leads to an increase in 
employment, to an improvement in economic competitiveness, and next to a stimulation of 
investment. According to Alesina and Perotti (1997), unit labour costs are the main factor 
behind expansionary fiscal consolidations. For whilst in a typical neoclassic model, labour 
supply depends on income and wealth effects, the authors defended that these effects are not so 
relevant. However, in a unionised labour market, increases in taxes can lead to strong increases 
in unit labour costs, reducing competitiveness. In this context, Carvalho (2009) found evidence 
that fiscal consolidations are highly probable to be successful if they are adequately combined 
with structural reforms.  
In addition, with regards the composition of fiscal consolidations, Cournède and Gonand 
(2006) argued that consolidations based on tax increases reduce investment incentives and 
offset interest rate and labour market effects, whereas spending cuts and welfare payments are 
more likely to provide expansionary results. On the other hand, Sutherland (1997) argued that 
in the case of significant amounts of government debt, a tax increase could increase private 
consumption, and thus postpone the passing on of the costs of fiscal consolidation to future 
generations, thus discouraging private saving. 
A few critical conditions are required to provide the possibility for an expansionary fiscal 
consolidation. The first is related to fiscal adjustment composition (as argued in the previous 
paragraph), where consolidations based on spending cuts have a higher hypothesis of 
stimulating output (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). Another condition is the initial state of public 
finances, where, as argued by Bertola and Drazen (1993), the policy effect depends on the 
expectations regarding future policies. According to Bertola and Drazen’s model, in a difficult 
situation, a perception of improvement (due to cuts in public expenditure) increases 
consumption. However, the result is different if the spending cuts take place simultaneously 
with a tax increase. 
The size and persistence of fiscal consolidation also plays a conditioning role, being a key 
factor for the success of the fiscal consolidation, i.e. by culminating in a reduction of the debt-
to-GDP ratio (McDermott and Wescott, 1996). Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), when studying 
OECD countries, reported that the impact of changes in public consumption can have different 
results, according to both the size and persistence of fiscal consolidation. Whereas normal 
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reductions in government consumption tend to lead to reductions in private consumption, if the 
shock is strong and persistent enough, this can lead to the opposite effect. Furthermore, 
increases in transfers can also increase the level of private consumption, if these increases are 
persistent. 
 
Empirical Results 
In terms of the empirical results concerning the fiscal instruments behind non-keynesian 
effects, Afonso (2010), using a fixed effects panel data strategy, realised that the long-run 
elasticity of private consumption is negative. In addition, a tax increase (during a fiscal 
consolidation) can have a positive impact on private consumption in the long run. In the case 
of social transfers, there is negative long-run elasticity (although only after the Maastricht 
Treaty signature). 
Afonso and Jalles (2014) studied the elasticities for OECD countries with four different 
definitions of fiscal consolidation episodes. The results showed that lower government 
expenditure increases private consumption. Furthermore, private investment reveals a non-
keynesian response and social transfers have a negative impact on private investment. 
With a similar specification, Afonso and Martins (2016) argued that, in fiscal 
consolidations, consumers do not demonstrate a Ricardian behavior, and rather there is a 
positive short-run elasticity of private consumption to income and to general government final 
consumption, in line with the keynesian theory. However, there is evidence of a non-keynesian 
effect in the absence of a fiscal consolidation, with a positive short-run elasticity of taxes to 
private consumption. In addition, they report that Keynesian effects prevail when fiscal 
consolidations are not matched by monetary easing. 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the results for fiscal elasticity (on private 
consumption) presented in various existing empirical analysis. Accordingly, when compared to 
previous studies, our paper provides an updated and more detailed analysis of fiscal elasticities 
and provides insights into how the results may change following a different identification 
approach.  
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Table 1 – Empirical results in the related literature: summary 
 
 
3. Identifying Fiscal Episodes 
Appendix 1 reports the summary statistics of the variables. Our data set comes from the EC 
AMECO Database. 
There are several ways to identify a fiscal episode, such as the implementation of clear 
policy actions (fiscal expansions or consolidations). When analysing the stance of fiscal 
policies, the literature highlights the structural balance, which results from the budget balance 
Authors (year) Methodology Sample Period Main results
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) OLS / 2SLS
OECD 
(19 countires)
1970-2000
1. Transfers reveals a positive elasticity during "normal times";
2. Facing fiscal episodes, taxes and government consumption 
have significant positive and negative impacts, respectively;
3. In both OLS and 2SLS methods, taxes and transfers appear to 
have non-keynesian effects on private consumption.
Miller and Russek (1999)
OLS Pooled 
Regression
OECD 
(19 countires)
1970-1996
1. There is some evidence of non-Keynesian effects;
2. Unusual fiscal contractions magnify the positive and negative 
effects of government spending and revenue on real private 
consumption spending.
EMU 
(14 countries)
1990-1998
EU and non-EU 1970-2000
Finland, 
France, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands
1970-2005
1. Limited evidences of non-keynesian effects;
2. For higher debt levels, the impact of government spending on 
private consumption is much smaller;
3. The effects of government investment on private 
consumption display a pattern similar to the one of taxes 
(negative).
EU
(9 countries)
1977-2004
1. Similar results for the impact of tax changes facing low and 
high debt ratios;
2. Government spending has a positive impact on private 
consumption, while investment has a negative impact.
Afonso (2010) Fixed Effects EU15 1970-2005
1. The long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to 
general government final consumption is negative;
2. A tax raise, together with a fiscal consolidation episode, could 
have a positive long-run effect on private consumption;
3. The long-run elasticity of social transfers is statistically 
significant and negative.
Afonso and Jalles (2014) IV - GLS OECD 1970-2010
1. Lower final government consumption increases private 
consumption;
2. There is some evidence of non-Keynesian effects for private 
investment.
Afonso and Martins (2016) Fixed Effects
EMU 
(14 countries)
1970-2013
1. There is a positive relationship between general government 
consumption expenditure and private consumption;
2. Consumers are not behaving in a Ricardian way;
3. There is evidences of non-Keynesian effects in the absence of 
fiscal consolidations (tax-based).
1. The evidence for non-linearities in the effects of fiscal 
adjustments is limited during the transition period to the EMU;
2. There is no evidence of non-linearities in both taxation and 
transfers;
3. Government consumption has a positive influence on private 
spending;
4.  The effects of fiscal adjustments on private spending, with 
the possible exception of transfers, appear to have been 
relatively small.
van Aarle and 
Garretsen (2001)
OLS
Fixed EffectsWeyerstrass et al. (2006)
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(in percentage of GDP or potential GDP), excluding cyclical and one-off effects. For the 
computation of the Cyclically Adjusted Balance (CAB), following the EU budgetary 
surveillance methodology, the CAB is derived as (Larch and Turrini, 2010): 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑡 − 𝜀 ∗ 𝑂𝐺𝑡,   (1) 
 
where, 𝐵𝐵𝑡 represents the nominal budget balance, 𝑂𝐺𝑡 the output gap (difference between the 
actual and potential output), and 𝜀 the budgetary sensitivity parameter. This parameter is 
calculated by aggregating the elasticities of individual revenue (η𝑅) and unemployment-related 
expenditure (η𝐺,𝑢), where they are weighted by the share of the total current taxes and total 
current primary expenditure, respectively (using the OECD and the European Commission 
Output Gap Working Group methodology). Thus, the difference yields the sensitivity 
parameter, as calculated by: 
 
𝜀 =  𝜀𝑅 − 𝜀𝐺      (2) 
𝜀𝑅 = η𝑅  
𝑅
𝑌
  ;     𝜀𝐺 = η𝐺  
𝐺
𝑌
     (3) 
 
where, 
 
η𝑅 = ∑ η𝑅,𝑖
4
𝑖=1
𝑅𝑖
𝑅
      η𝐺 = η𝐺,𝑢
𝐺𝑢
𝐺
.  (4) 
 
Whilst the IMF (1993) defines a fiscal episode as being a change of at least 1.5 p.p. in the 
structural balance during two consecutive years, other organisations, such as the OECD (1996), 
only considered variations above 3 p.p. in the structural balance. However, the structural 
balance might not be capable to capture all the changes in the economic environment, due to 
liquidity conditions, inflation, and consequently the effects in real interest rates. For this reason, 
the best indicator for measuring the discretionary orientation of fiscal policy is the structural 
primary balance, i.e., the structural balance, excluding interest payments. 
Accordingly, when considering the structural primary balance, Alesina and Perotti (1995) 
identify fiscal episodes as being: i) years when the primary structural balance varies more than 
one standard deviation from the country average, or; ii) years when there is a change of at least 
1.5 p.p. in the primary structural balance.  
8 
 
In our study, we consider the definition made by Alesina and Ardagna, (2010), where a fiscal 
episode, expansion (𝐹𝐸𝐸) or contraction (𝐹𝐸𝐶) occurs when there is a change of at least 1.5 p.p. 
in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB). 
 
𝐹𝐸𝐸 = {
1; ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 ≤ −1.5
0; ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 > −1.5
 ;   𝐹𝐸𝐶 = {
1; ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 ≥ 1.5
0; ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 < 1.5
 .   (5) 
 
In practical terms, we need to be aware that a series break occurs in 1995, which represents 
the transition from the former definitions to the ESA 2010. For this reason, our estimations do 
not consider fiscal episodes that occurred during 1995. Table 2 reports all the fiscal episodes, 
based on the CAPB thresholds as defined in (5). 
 
Table 2 – Fiscal episodes by date, CAPB-based 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Expansions Consolidations
ΔCAPB<-1.5 ΔCAPB>1.5
Belgium 1972, 1976, 1980, 2003, 2005, 2009 1982, 1984, 2006 1966-2017
Germany 1995, 2001, 2010 1996, 2000, 2011 1991-2017
Estonia 1996, 1998, 2005, 2007-2008, 2011-
2012
2009 1996-2017
Ireland 1974-1975, 1978, 1990, 2001, 2007-
2010
1976, 1982-1983, 1988, 2000, 2003, 
2011-2013
1970-2017
Greece 1975, 1981, 1985, 1988-1989, 2001, 
2003-2004, 2006, 2008-2009, 2013, 
2015
1982, 1986-1987, 1991, 1994, 1996, 
2005, 2010-2011, 2014, 2016
1966-2017
Spain 2008-2009 1986, 1992, 1996, 2010, 2013 1971-2017
France 2009 1996 1971-2017
Italy 1972, 1981, 2000 1976, 1982, 1991-1993, 1997, 2007, 
2012
1971-2017
Cyprus 2002, 2008-2009, 2014 2007, 2012-2013, 2015 1999-2017
Latvia 1998-1999, 2006 2009, 2011-2012 1998-2017
Lithuania 2007, 2011 1998-1999, 2010, 2012 1998-2017
Luxembourg 1979, 1986, 2002 1982-1983, 1985, 2005 1971-1987, 
1996-2017
Malta 1996, 1998, 2003, 2008 1999, 2004, 2009, 2016-2017 1996-2017
Netherlands 1986, 2001, 2009 1977, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2013, 2016 1970-2017
Austria 1967, 1975, 2004 1984, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2015 1966-2017
Portugal 1971, 1972, 1974, 1978, 1980-1981, 
1990, 1993, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2009-
2010, 2014, 2017
1982-1983, 1986, 1992, 2002, 2006, 
2011-2012, 2015-2016
1966-2017
Slovenia 2013 2012, 2014, 2015 1999-2017
Slovakia 2000, 2002, 2005-2006, 2009 1998, 2001, 2003, 2011, 2013 1998-2017
Finland 1978-1979, 1982, 1987, 1991, 2001, 
2009-2010
1967, 1976, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1996, 
1998, 2000
1966-2017
Total 81 98
Time-series
Fiscal Episodes
Country
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Still within this context, the IMF proposed an alternative approach to determine fiscal 
episodes. Indeed, Devries et al. (2011) present a dataset of fiscal consolidations based on a so-
called narrative approach. These fiscal consolidation episodes were constructed based on policy 
documents, central banks reports, Converge and Stability Programmes submitted to the 
European Commission, and IMF and OECD reports.  
Regarding this issue, Guajardo et al. (2014) criticised the CAPB approach as “being 
imprecise and biased toward overstating the potential expansionary effects of fiscal 
adjustments”. Yang et al. (2015) tried to understand which approach is the most accurate to 
analyse the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy: either the one based on changes in the 
CAPB, or the narrative approach based on historical records of policy measures. These authors 
concluded that, although the narrative approach could be considered superior for identifying 
fiscal episodes correctly, the CAPB has the advantage of being much easier to implement and 
apply. These authors also argued that, contrary to the narrative approach, the empirical literature 
based on a CAPB approach supports the existence of non-keynesian effects. 
More recently, Gupta et al. (2017) updated the above-mentioned IMF database, by including 
observations up until 2015. Following this discussion, we made a comparison of the fiscal 
consolidations captured by our threshold and those identified in both Devries et al. (2011) and 
Gupta et al. (2017). It should be noted that the samples only have 10 countries in common 
during the period of 1978-2015. Table 3 compares the CAPB-based fiscal consolidation 
episodes with the so-called “narrative approach” consolidation episodes. 
One can observe that the CAPB approach is more demanding than the narrative approach. 
For while the CAPB approach only captures 51 episodes, the narrative one captures 131 (34.5% 
of the entire sample). Furthermore, we observe that only 34 fiscal consolidation episodes were 
identified simultaneously with both approaches. Since the more lenient requirements of the 
narrative approach can raise doubts about this approach’s ability to effectively distinguish fiscal 
episodes from “normal times”, we would argue that the traditional CAPB approach might be 
an appropriate method to pursue our study. Furthermore, the use of a rule to determine fiscal 
episodes, based on the CAPB, also ensures a certain level of homogeneity across countries, 
although this is more difficult to carry out, based on economists’ assessments of several 
different policy reports for the country sample. 
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Table 3 – Comparison of Approaches 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, and Devries et al. (2011) and Gupta et al. (2017).  
 
In our next step, we consider as a non-keynesian episode, those episodes where: i) the 
average real GDP growth during the two years after the fiscal contraction is greater than the 
growth during the previous two years (before expansionary consolidations), and; ii) real GDP 
growth during the two years after the expansions is smaller than the average growth during the 
previous two years (before recessive expansions). Table 4 presents these episodes. 
One can conclude that, from the 81 fiscal expansionary episodes analysed (reported in Table 
2), 52 of them led to recessive results. This can be explained by the application of not 
completely successful countercyclical policies, in an attempt to invert the business cycle. The 
beginning of the GFC is an example of this hypothesis, where during the period between 2007 
and 2009, 19 of the 52 recessive expansions occurred. Additionally, we identify expansionary 
fiscal consolidations in 45 of the 98 contractionary fiscal episodes (see Table 2 and Table 4). 
In order to further illustrate this issue, in Appendix 3 we provide a case study analysis from 
Portugal - a small Euro Area open economy, which was subject to an international financial 
support programme in the aftermath of the GFC. 
 
 
 
Country CAPB Approach Narrative Approach Common Episodes
Belgium 1982, 1984, 2006 1982-1985, 1987, 1990, 1992-1994, 
1996-1997, 2010-2015
1982
Germany 1996, 2000, 2011 1982-1984, 1991-1995, 1997-2000, 
2003-2004, 2006-2007, 2011-2012
2000, 2011
Ireland 1982-1983, 1988, 2000, 2003, 2011-
2013
1982-1988, 2009-2015 1982, 1983, 1988, 2013-2015
Spain 1986, 1992, 1996, 2010, 2012 1983-1984, 1989-1990, 1992-1997, 
2009-2015
1992, 1996, 2010, 2012
France 1996 1979, 1987, 1989, 1991-1992, 1995-
1997, 1999-2000, 2011-2015
1996
Italy 1982, 1991-1993, 1997, 2007, 2012 1991-1998, 2004-2007, 2010-2015 1991-1993, 1997, 2007, 2012
Netherlands 1991, 1993, 1996, 2013 1981-1988, 1991-1993, 2004-2005, 
2011-2013, 2015
1991, 1993, 2013
Austria 1984, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2015 1980-1981, 1984, 1996-1997, 2001-
2002, 2011-2012, 2015
1984, 1997, 2001, 2015
Portugal 1982-1983, 1986, 1992, 2002, 2006, 
2011-2012, 2015
1983, 2000, 2002-2003, 2005-2007, 
2010-2015
1983, 2002, 2006, 2011-2012, 
2015
Finland 1981, 1984, 1988, 1996, 1998, 2000 1992-1997, 2011 1997
Total 51 131 34
Fiscal Consolidations
11 
 
Table 4 – Non-keynesian episodes, by date 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
4. Empirical Assessment 
4.1. Baseline results 
Using annual data for the 19 Euro Area countries for the period of 1960-2017 (data sourced 
from the AMECO database), we estimate the short- and long-run elasticities of private 
consumption to fiscal instruments, using dummies to identify the fiscal episodes. We focus on 
understanding how the fiscal elasticities vary during fiscal consolidations (in comparison to 
“normal times”) and also try to find possible sources of non-keynesian effects. 
Therefore, we opted to use a Fixed Effects model to assess the impact of fiscal variables 
throughout time, assuming that the time-invariant characteristics are country-specific. As the 
fixed effects model removes the effect of time-invariant characteristics from the predictor 
variables, we believe that this is a suitable approach. Furthermore, we carried out a redundant 
Fixed Effects Likelihood test for all the estimations, where the null hypothesis (no unobserved 
heterogeneity) was rejected. 
Country Recessive expansions  Expansionary consolidations
Belgium 1980, 2009 1984, 2006
Germany 2001 2000, 2011
Estonia 1998, 2007, 2008, 2012
Ireland 1974-1975, 1990, 2001, 2007-2009 1988, 2011, 2013
Greece 1981, 2004, 2008-2009 1994, 2014, 2016
Spain 2008-2009 1986, 1996, 2010, 2013
France 2009
Italy 1981 1976
Cyprus 2002, 2008-2009 2007, 2015
Latvia 1998-1999 2011, 2012
Lithuania 2007 2010
Luxembourg 1979, 2002 1982-1983, 1985, 2005
Malta 1996, 1998, 2003, 2008 1999
Netherlands 1986, 2001, 2009 1977, 1993, 1996, 2013, 2016
Austria 1967, 1975 1997, 2005, 2015
Portugal 1972, 1974, 1980-1981, 1990, 1993, 
2001, 2009
1986, 2006, 2015-2016
Slovenia 2014-2015
Slovakia 2009 2001, 2003, 2011
Finland 1982, 1991, 2001, 2009 1984, 1988, 1996
Total 52 45
Non-keynesian episodes
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The baseline specification is: 
 
∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣_𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜆1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣_𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆2∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐸
𝐶 X (𝛽1∆𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝑂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5∆𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7∆𝐺𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽11∆𝑂𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑂𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡−1) + (1 − 𝐹𝐸
𝐶) X  (𝛼1∆𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3∆𝑂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼4𝑂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼5∆𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼7∆𝐺𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐺𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼9∆𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛼11∆𝑂𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑂𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 ,             (6) 
 
where i and t identifies the country and sample, FE is a dummy variable for fiscal episodes 
(consolidations in this specification) which assumes 1 in the case of a consolidation, and 0 
otherwise. Y reflects the output, and the remaining variables represent several general 
government budgetary components: Tax – tax revenue; ORev – other revenue; CE – 
compensation to employees; GFKF – public investment; Social – social benefits; OExp – other 
expenditure. Furthermore, 𝑐𝑖 is an autonomous term that captures countries’ individual 
characteristics, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 represents disturbances. The data is used as a natural logarithm of real 
per capita values. Table 5 presents the baseline results. 
The first conclusion that we can make from Table 5 is that the cross-section fixed effects 
method is justified, as the result of the Redundant Fixed Effects Test rejects the null-hypothesis. 
Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the first two columns of the output in Table 5. 
Regarding short-run elasticities, “Tax revenue” (0.11), “Compensation to employees” 
(0.05), “Investment” (0.02), and “Other expenditure” (0.02) all have a statistically-significant 
expansionary effect during “normal times”. Furthermore, when fiscal consolidations occur, 
only “Other revenue” (-0.04) and “Social benefits” (-0.15) appear to have a significant 
(negative) impact on private consumption. In terms of long-run elasticities, both “Taxes” (0.65) 
and “Investment” (0.12) show significant effects on long-run private consumption during 
“normal times”, while the “Tax revenue” budgetary item seems to have the only significant 
(0.85) elasticity when fiscal consolidations occur. 
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Table 5 – Baseline results, using fiscal consolidations 
(19 Euro Area countries) 
 
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** and * 
respectively (value of the t statistic in brackets). 
C -0.068** (-2.463) -0.069*** (-2.585)
λ1 Priv_Ct-1 -0.047*** (-3.465) -0.049*** (-3.662)
λ2 ΔYt 0.580*** (17.28) 0.579*** (17.03)
λ3 Yt-1 0.000 (0.065) 0.002 (0.196)
β1 ΔTaxt 0.102 (1.548) 0.133*** (2.793)
β2 Taxt-1 0.040** (1.985) 0.036** (2.295)
β3 ΔORevt -0.042*** (-2.875) -0.012 (-1.256)
β4 ORevt-1 -0.004 (-0.835) -0.001 (-0.231)
β5 ΔCEt 0.108 (1.466) -0.038 (-0.819)
β6 CEt-1 0.020 (1.242) 0.003 (0.251)
β7 ΔGFKFt 0.018 (1.238) 0.031** (2.090)
β8 GFKFt-1 -0.005 (-0.689) 0.010* (1.741)
β9 ΔSocialt -0.150*** (-3.568) -0.012 (-0.401)
β10 Socialt-1 -0.012 (-1.027) -0.021** (-2.017)
β11 ΔOExpt -0.021 (-1.095) -0.001 (-0.067)
β12 OExpt-1 -0.014 (-1.429) 0.001 (0.135)
α1 ΔTaxt 0.107*** (3.987) 0.122*** (3.930)
α2 Taxt-1 0.030** (2.465) 0.030** (2.426)
α3 ΔORevt -0.006 (-1.334) -0.010* (-1.864)
α4 ORevt-1 0.001 (0.408) 0.000 (0.226)
α5 ΔCEt 0.050** (2.019) 0.109*** (3.918)
α6 CEt-1 -0.001 (-0.153) -0.000 (-0.046)
α7 ΔGFKFt 0.018*** (2.762) 0.012* (1.840)
α8 GFKFt-1 0.005* (1.685) 0.001 (0.303)
α9 ΔSocialt 0.015 (0.909) -0.027 (-1.370)
α10 Socialt-1 -0.006 (-1.029) -0.003 (-0.550)
α11 ΔOExpt 0.020** (2.075) 0.017 (1.610)
α12 OExpt-1 -0.000 (-0.136) -0.000 (-0.012)
N 703 703
R
2
0,719 0,705
Redundant FE Test t-stat. p-val.
1,94 0,01
Fiscal Consolidations
Country Fixed Effects OLS
ΔPriv_Ct
x FE
C
x (1-FE
C
)
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Applying the Wald Test (last panel in Table 5), we found that “Other revenue”, “Social 
benefits”, and “Other expenditure” all have statistically different short-term elasticities, with 
the worst impact occurring during fiscal consolidations. However, it is not possible to conclude 
that the budgetary item “Other expenditure” has a negative (different from zero) impact during 
“normal times”. 
Despite the fact that no major differences were observed in fiscal consolidation periods, the 
positive “Tax revenue” elasticity indicates that consumers are behaving in a Ricardian way, as 
they perceive a future increase in taxation to be a sign of future additional government spending. 
These results are less in line with the findings of Alesina et al. (2017), where it is argued that 
cuts in government spending and in transfers are less recessive than tax-based consolidations. 
Furthermore, the response of private consumption to “Social benefits” changes during fiscal 
consolidations could well be a source of non-keynesian episodes (expansionary consolidations), 
whereas cuts in expenditure stimulate private consumption. One can hypothesise that such 
-β2/λ1 Tax 0,85
-β4/λ1 ORev -0,09
-β6/λ1 CE 0,43
-β8/λ1 GFKF -0,11
-β10/λ1 Social -0,26
-β12/λ1 OExp -0,31
-α2/λ1 Tax 0,65
-α4/λ1 ORev 0,02
-α6/λ1 CE -0,04
-α8/λ1 GFKF 0,12
-α10/λ1 Social -0,13
-α12/λ1 OExp -0,01
Long-Run Elasticities
x FE
C
x (1-FE
C
)
Null Hypotesis t-stat. p-val.
β1-α1=0 -0.07 0.95
β3-α3=0 -2.27 0.02
β5-α5=0 0.74 0.46
β8-α8=0 -0.03 0.98
β7-α7=0 -1.41 0.16
β9-α9=0 -3.77 0.00
β10-α10=0 -0.54 0.59
β11-α11=0 -1.89 0.06
Wald Test
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behaviour might be a consequence of fiscal sustainability perceptions (related to ageing costs 
and debt management) and of hypothetical perverse incentives created by the attribution of 
social benefits during a long-time range.  
Another possible reason for the negative elasticity of “Social benefits” has to do with the 
propensity to save. As observed in several European countries during the GFC, the expected 
saving rates (related to precautionary reasons) broke the link between available income and the 
consumption level. Indeed, savings rates even increased. In addition, since strong pro-cyclical 
fiscal consolidations (episodes) occurred during the crisis, Social benefits increased, due to high 
unemployment levels being registered in parallel with other spending cuts that had the effect of 
reducing available income. Consumers could also perceive a substitution effect on private 
consumption, where the government replaces private sector expenses, or brings about an 
anticipation of future higher taxes to finance the current social transfers. 
 
4.2. The Narrative Approach and CAPB 
Following the discussion presented above, when considering the best approach to identify 
fiscal consolidation episodes, we repeat the baseline Fixed Effects estimation (Table 5), using 
the contractionary fiscal episodes identified in Devries et al. (2011) and Gupta (2017). Since 
the sample only covers 10 Euro Area countries (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, 
Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Finland) during the period of 1978-2015, we also re-
estimated the baseline using the CAPB approach for this sub-sample, in order to provide a fair 
comparison (see Table 6). 
According to Table 6, using the Narrative Approach to identify fiscal consolidations, both 
the short- and long-run elasticities of “Tax revenue” are statistically significant, as well as the 
short-run elasticities of “Other revenues”, “Compensation to Employees”, and “Other 
expenditure”. During “normal times”, not only does the short-run, but also the long-run 
elasticity of “Compensation to employees” becomes significant, as well as the short-run 
elasticity of “Investment”. 
The results also show that private consumption has a non-keynesian response to a “Tax 
revenue” shock (positive) - both in the short and long-run, i.e., an increase in the tax burden 
appears to stimulate private consumption. In addition, contrary to what occurs during fiscal 
consolidations, an increase in “Other expenditures” seems to have a recessive impact during 
normal times. 
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Table 6 – Comparison: the Narrative Approach and CAPB 
(10 Euro Area countries) 
 
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** and * 
respectively (value of the t statistic in brackets). 
C -0,226*** (-4,378) -0,213*** (-4,165)
λ1 Priv_Ct-1 -0,123*** (-5,473) -0,113*** (-4,881)
λ2 ΔYt 0,410*** (9,851) 0,390*** (9,090)
λ3 Yt-1 0,020 (1,153) 0,014 (0,830)
β1 ΔTaxt 0,123*** (2,888) 0,102 (1,122)
β2 Taxt-1 0,071*** (3,886) 0,094*** (3,957)
β3 ΔORevt -0,018* (-1,912) -0,040** (-2,435)
β4 ORevt-1 -0,002 (-0,762) -0,008 (-1,253)
β5 ΔCEt 0,164*** (3,279) 0,099 (1,022)
β6 CEt-1 0,012 (0,951) 0,017 (0,919)
β7 ΔGFKFt 0,015 (1,163) 0,045** (2,148)
β8 GFKFt-1 -0,004 (-0,691) -0,002 (-0,193)
β9 ΔSocialt -0,064 (-1,574) -0,232*** (-3,458)
β10 Socialt-1 -0,012 (-1,224) -0,029** (-2,204)
β11 ΔOExpt 0,023** (1,999) -0,041 (-1,427)
β12 OExpt-1 0,003 (0,469) -0,008 (-0,587)
α1 ΔTaxt 0,103*** (3,006) 0,146*** (4,587)
α2 Taxt-1 0,054*** (3,406) 0,063*** (4,094)
α3 ΔORevt -0,009* (-1,674) -0,007 (-1,502)
α4 ORevt-1 -0,005 (-1,482) -0,006** (-2,144)
α5 ΔCEt 0,013 (0,701) 0,016 (0,874)
α6 CEt-1 0,029*** (2,757) 0,018* (1,798)
α7 ΔGFKFt 0,029*** (2,645) 0,032*** (3,676)
α8 GFKFt-1 0,003 (0,739) 0,003 (0,753)
α9 ΔSocialt -0,024 (-1,107) 0,004 (0,189)
α10 Socialt-1 -0,011 (-1,468) -0,015** (-2,213)
α11 ΔOExpt -0,030** (-2,092) -0,008 (-0,771)
α12 OExpt-1 0,004 (0,701) 0,005 (0,917)
N 357 357
R
2
0,707 0,694
x FE
C
x (1-FE
C
)
Fiscal Consolidations
ΔPriv_Ct
Narrative Approach CAPB
17 
 
 
 
Compared to the CAPB-based results, we can see that, under austerity policies, with the 
exception of the “Investment” and “Other revenue” budgetary items, the statistically-significant 
variables have a non-keynesian behaviour. Whilst public “Investment” seems to lead to a 
crowding in effect of private consumption, an increase in “Social benefits” has a negative 
impact on private consumption. 
Furthermore, it is relevant to highlight that when using both approaches (which gives 
robustness to Table 5’s output), and independent of the existence of a fiscal episode, the “Tax 
revenue” budgetary item presents an expansionary impact, which could well be justified by the 
expectation of a future increase in Government expenditure.  
 
4.3. Robustness 
Since, in the context of the EMU, exchange rate policies are unavailable and the inflation 
rate has been undoubtedly low, we aim to assess whether fiscal elasticities changed after 
countries joined the Euro Area. Furthermore, as the business cycle is highly influenced by 
international factors (without strong barriers to capital, human, or capital circulation), we also 
take into account the role of economic (aggregate) growth in the EMU.  
Accordingly, we divided the sample, using a dummy for the EMU that assumes the value of 
1 for countries inside the Euro Area, and the 0 for countries not in the EMU. We also included 
the variable 𝑌𝑎𝑣, which represents the natural logarithm of the (weighted) average of the EMU 
output per capita (after joining the Union) in order to control for the European business cycle, 
as was performed by Afonso and Martins (2016).  
-β2/λ1 Tax
-β4/λ1 ORev
-β6/λ1 CE
-β8/λ1 GFKF
-β10/λ1 Social
-β12/λ1 OExp
-α2/λ1 Tax
-α4/λ1 ORev
-α6/λ1 CE
-α8/λ1 GFKF
-α10/λ1 Social
-α12/λ1 OExp
Long-Run Elasticities
-0,03
0,11
0,02
-0,01
0,02
0,31
-0,05
0,03
-0,04
0,17
0,15
0,06
0,07
-0,09
0,11
0,07
-0,18
-0,40
-0,08
0,20
Narrative Approach CAPB
0,59
0,01
0,09
-0,05
x FE
C
x (1-FE
C
)
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Table 7 reports these estimation results. We can observe that the so-called non-keynesian 
behaviour of both “Other expenditure” and “Investment” are no longer perceived after joining 
the EMU (which is probably related to a crowding out effect, were the reduction of expenditure 
leaves economic resources for the private sector, and diminishes the pressure on interest rates). 
Hence, after the EMU, it was harder to observe expansionary fiscal consolidations for these 
budgetary categories. 
 
Table 7 –Fiscal consolidations (controlling EMU membership) 
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** and * 
respectively (value of the t statistic in brackets). 
 
C 0.062 (0.692) -0.021 (-0.163) -0.084** (-2.137)
λ1 Priv_Ct-1 -0.115*** (-4.845) -0.102*** (-3.148) -0.048*** (-2.833)
λ2 ΔYt 0.424*** (5.823) 0.335*** (6.457) 0.689*** (15.46)
λ3 Yt-1 0.067** (2.168) 0.020 (0.646) -0.005 (-0.285)
λ4 Δ(Yt -Y
av
t ) 0.081 (1.061)
λ5 Yt-1 -Y
av
t-1 0.000 (0.026)
β1 ΔTaxt 0.164* (1.912) 0.183* (1.734) 0.104 (1.056)
β2 Taxt-1 0.020 (0.755) 0.050 (1.289) 0.023 (0.705)
β3 ΔORevt -0.023*** (-3.370) -0.071*** (-2.743) -0.023 (-1.308)
β4 ORevt-1 -0.001 (-1.191) -0.013 (-0.822) -0.001 (-0.228)
β5 ΔCEt 0.1177 (-0.097) 0.142 (1.357) 0.117 (1.084)
β6 CEt-1 0.005 (0.257) 0.006 (0.224) 0.048* (1.852)
β7 ΔGFKFt 0.045*** (2.704) 0.047** (2.451) -0.046* (-1.755)
β8 GFKFt-1 0.011 (1.203) -0.000 (-0.032) -0.016 (-1.475)
β9 ΔSocialt -0.195*** (-2.922) -0.146** (-2.316) -0.195*** (-2.822)
β10 Socialt-1 -0.004 (-1.068) -0.030 (-1.306) -0.004 (-0.256)
β11 ΔOExpt -0.069 (-0.605) 0.015 (0.474) -0.069** (-2.097)
β12 OExpt-1 -0.017 (-0.180) 0.015 (0.742) -0.017 (-1.296)
α1 ΔTaxt 0.186*** (5.193) 0.263*** (6.526) 0.061* (1.681)
α2 Taxt-1 0.049** (2.313) 0.064** (2.268) 0.039* (1.956)
α3 ΔORevt -0.010 (-0.447) -0.001 (-0.115) -0.010* (-1.786)
α4 ORevt-1 0.007 (1.327) 0.003 (0.270) -0.001 (-0.417)
α5 ΔCEt 0.0737 (-1.074) -0.021 (-0.473) 0.073** (2.300)
α6 CEt-1 0.0020** (-2.282) -0.044* (-1.865) 0.002 (0.125)
α7 ΔGFKFt 0.033*** (3.911) 0.026*** (2.669) 0.009 (1.021)
α8 GFKFt-1 0.021*** (3.225) 0.015* (1.862) -0.000 (-0.168)
α9 ΔSocialt 0.039 (1.564) 0.093** (2.203) 0.016 (0.849)
α10 Socialt-1 -0.011 (-0.738) -0.013 (-0.827) -0.011 (-1.360)
α11 ΔOExpt 0.019* (1.687) 0.012 (0.894) 0.034** (2.530)
α12 OExpt-1 0.0035** (-2.156) 0.005 (0.313) 0.003 (0.508)
N 428 280 423
R
2
0,789 0,793 0,720
Redundant FE Test t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val.
2,56 0,00 2,10 0,01 2,23 0,00
x (1-FE
C
)
Fiscal Consolidations
ΔPriv_Ct
EMU (Yt-Y
av
t) EMU 1-EMU
x FE
C
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Regarding “Social benefits”, we find a negative elasticity both before and after the EMU, 
with a significate and expansionary (keynesian) impact during “normal times” in the EMU. In 
a last robustness estimation (Equation 7), we identified expansionary fiscal episodes as a way 
of assessing how fiscal consolidations are different from fiscal expansions, and also in order to 
achieve a more accurate “normal times” identification: 
 
∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣_𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜆1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣_𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆2∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑌𝑡−1
+ 𝐹𝐸𝐶 X (𝛽1∆𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝑂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5∆𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7∆𝐺𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11∆𝑂𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑂𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡−1)
+ 𝐹𝐸𝐸 X  (𝛼1∆𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3∆𝑂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼5∆𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼7∆𝐺𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐺𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼9∆𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼11∆𝑂𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑂𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡−1)
+ (1 − 𝐹𝐸𝐶)(1 − 𝐹𝐸𝐸) X (𝜑1∆𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜑3∆𝑂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑4𝑂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜑5∆𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑6𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜑7∆𝐺𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑8𝐺𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜑9∆𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜑10𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜑11∆𝑂𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑12𝑂𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡−1).        (7) 
 
In Table 8, we can observe that, in the case of fiscal expansions, “Taxes” and “Investment” 
are significantly expansionary, both in the short (0.14 and 0.03, respectively) and in the long 
run (0.74 and 0.23), and also that “Social benefits” have a negative long-run elasticity (-0.44). 
Once again, “Social benefits” show a negative elasticity (-0.15) in the context of fiscal 
consolidations. 
By double-checking the Wald Test again, we find that: i) in the short run, “Other revenue” 
and “Social benefits” are more recessive during consolidations than during expansions, and that 
“Taxes” and “Compensation to employees” have a more expansionary effect. Furthermore, the 
“Other revenue”, “Social benefits” and “Other expenditure” items are more recessive during 
fiscal consolidations than during “normal times” (which corroborates our first estimation 
results), and; ii) in the long run, “Investment” has a more recessive impact on private 
consumption during consolidations than during expansions, and “Social benefits” are more 
recessive in expansions than during “normal times”. 
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Table 8 –Fiscal consolidations and expansions 
  
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** and * 
respectively (value of the t statistic in brackets). 
 
C -0.066** (-2.384)
λ2 Priv_Ct-1 -0.048*** (-3.532)
λ3 ΔYt 0.569*** (15.73)
λ4 Yt-1 0.001 (0.167)
β1 ΔTaxt 0.106 (1.598)
β2 Taxt-1 0.039* (1.961)
β3 ΔORevt -0.042*** (-2.880)
β4 ORevt-1 -0.004 (-0.922)
β5 ΔCEt 0.108 (1.460)
β6 CEt-1 0.019 (1.213)
β7 ΔGFKFt 0.017 (1.219)
β8 GFKFt-1 -0.005 (-0.769)
β9 ΔSocialt -0.152*** (-3.610)
β10 Socialt-1 -0.011 (-0.982)
β11 ΔOExpt -0.022 (-1.111)
β12 OExpt-1 -0.013 (-1.351)
α1 ΔTaxt 0.137*** (2.869)
α2 Taxt-1 0.035** (2.210)
α3 ΔORevt -0.012 (-1.250)
α4 ORevt-1 -0.001 (-0.276)
α5 ΔCEt -0.042 (-0.920)
α6 CEt-1 0.006 (0.389)
α7 ΔGFKFt 0.031** (2.107)
α8 GFKFt-1 0.010* (1.799)
α9 ΔSocialt -0.016 (-0.540)
α10 Socialt-1 -0.021** (-2.047)
α11 ΔOExpt -0.003 (-0.196)
α12 OExpt-1 0.000 (0.042)
φ1 ΔTaxt 0.124*** (3.362)
φ2 Taxt-1 0.028** (2.141)
φ3 ΔORevt -0.005 (-0.759)
φ4 ORevt-1 0.000 (0.279)
φ5 ΔCEt 0.082** (2.570)
φ6 CEt-1 -0.003 (-0.322)
φ7 ΔGFKFt 0.011 (1.458)
φ8 GFKFt-1 0.003 (0.833)
φ9 ΔSocialt 0.003 (0.142)
φ10 Socialt-1 -0.002 (-0.457)
φ11 ΔOExpt 0.028* (1.670)
φ12 OExpt-1 0.001 (0.334)
N 703
R
2
0.726
Redundant FE Test t-stat. p-val.
1.77 0.03
x (1-FE
C
) x 
(1-FE
E
)
Fiscal Episodes
ΔPriv_Ct
x FE
C
x FE
E
Null Hypotesis t-stat. p-val.
β1-α1=0 1.64 0.10
β3-α3=0 -1.66 0.10
β5-α5=0 1.71 0.09
β7-α7=0 -0.64 0.52
β8-α8=0 -1.82 0.07
β9-α9=0 -2.67 0.01
β10-α10=0 0.68 0.50
Null Hypotesis t-stat. p-val.
β1-φ1=0 -0.25 0.80
β3-φ3=0 -2.32 0.02
β5-φ5=0 0.32 0.75
β9-φ9=0 -3.40 0.00
β11-φ11=0 -1.96 0.05
Null Hypotesis t-stat. p-val.
α7-φ7=0 1.17 0.24
α8-φ8=0 -0.07 0.94
α10-φ10=0 -1.81 0.07
α11-φ11=0 -1.41 0.16
Expansions vs Normal Times
Wald Test
Consolidations vs Expansions
Consolidations vs Normal Times
-β2/λ1 Tax 0,82
-β4/λ1 ORev -0,09
-β6/λ1 CE 0,41
-β8/λ1 GFKF -0,12
-β10/λ1 Social -0,24
-β12/λ1 OExp -0,28
-β2/λ1 Tax 0,74
-β4/λ1 ORev -0,03
-β6/λ1 CE 0,13
-β8/λ1 GFKF 0,23
-β10/λ1 Social -0,44
-β12/λ1 OExp 0,01
Long-Run Elasticities
Fiscal Expansions
Fiscal Consolidations
Long-Run Elasticities
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Thus, according to the three sets of estimated specifications, we can argue that “Social 
benefits” could also be the source of long-term non-keynesian effects during fiscal expansions, 
albeit with a smaller magnitude than during consolidations.4 
 
5. Conclusions 
We studied the relevance of a series of fiscal instruments for the existence of varying fiscal 
elasticities, in other words, for the existence of possible non-keynesian effects, on private 
consumption during fiscal episodes. Accordingly, we estimated short- and long-run elasticities 
of private consumption to budgetary components, using dummy variables to identify fiscal 
episodes and also as a way of differentiating countries inside and outside the EMU. For the 
empirical analysis, we used a Fixed Effects model, covering 19 Euro Area countries during the 
period of 1960-2017. 
The results show that the budgetary categories “Tax revenue”, “Compensation to 
employees”, “Investment”, and “Other expenditure” all have a short-run expansionary effect 
during “normal times”. On the other hand, in the context of fiscal consolidations, the “Other 
revenue” and “Social benefits” items have significant (negative) impacts. The positive “Tax 
revenue” elasticities indicate that consumers are Ricardian, in that they take into account in 
their decisions the likely increase in taxation as being a sign of future government spending. 
In terms of estimated long-run elasticities, both “Taxes” and “Investment” have significant 
positive effects during so-called fiscal “normal times”, while “Tax revenue” seems to have a 
statistically-significant elasticity when a fiscal consolidation occurs. 
Using a narrative approach (instead of the traditional CAPB) to identify fiscal 
consolidations, private consumption continues to exhibit a non-keynesian response to tax 
increases, both in the short and long-run, and “other expenditures” seems to have a recessive 
impact during “normal times”. 
Furthermore, since the non-keynesian behaviour of both “Other expenditure” and 
“Investment” was no longer perceived after joining the EMU, we can argue that expansionary 
fiscal consolidations became more difficult to observe after the EMU. 
Lastly, when comparing short-run elasticities during fiscal expansions, “normal times”, and 
during fiscal contractions, both “Other revenue” and “Social benefits” are more recessive 
during consolidations than during expansions and “normal times”. Furthermore, “Taxes” and 
                                                             
4 Appendix 2 provides a summary of short-term elasticities for a better understanding and comparison of results. 
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“Compensation to employees” demonstrate more expansionary elasticities during fiscal 
consolidations than in the case of fiscal expansions. 
Thus, according to our main results, the “Social benefits” budgetary component appears to 
contribute the most to the creation of a non-keynesian effect, and it is possible to conclude the 
existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations, with varying fiscal elasticities. Furthermore, 
“Social benefits” could well be a source of long-term negative responses of private consumption 
when fiscal expansions take place, albeit with a smaller magnitude than during fiscal 
consolidations. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1 – Summary statistics, full panel, 1960-2017 
 
  Source: AMECO 
Note: Both fiscal instruments and private consumption are presented as percentage of GDP, population is 
presented in thousands of people, and real GDP in billion euros (2010 prices). 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Table A2 - Results summary: Short-run elasticities 
 
Only statistically-significant short-run elasticities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATISTICS Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Kurtosis Observ.
Priv_C 57.84 57.39 81.43 30.43 7.89 4.21 915
Tax 34.71 34.67 48.00 12.24 7.28 2.90 760
ORev 4.49 4.51 44.46 0.55 2.14 3.26 760
CE 10.54 10.55 16.68 5.12 2.00 2.74 760
GFKF 3.43 3.48 6.32 1.24 1.00 2.52 765
Social 14.11 14.06 26.40 2.49 4.43 2.94 760
OExp 13.88 13.77 36.00 3.02 4.58 3.13 760
Population 16238.9 5368.5 82659.0 306.3 22960.8 4.26 1102
Real GDP (=2010) 388.8 147.1 2918.8 3.5 589.2 7.09 855
Normal 
times
Consol.
Normal 
times
Consol.
Normal 
times
Consol.
Normal 
times
Consol.
Normal 
times
Consol.
Normal 
times
Expans. Consol.
D Tax 0.107 0.146 0.103 0.123 0.263 0.183 0.061 0.124 0.137
D Orev -0.042 -0.040 -0.009 -0.018 -0.071 -0.010 -0.042
D CE 0.050 0.164 0.073 0.082
D GFKF 0.018 0.032 0.045 0.029 0.026 0.047 -0.046 0.031
D Social -0.150 -0.232 0.093 -0.146 -0.195 -0.152
D OExp 0.020 -0.030 0.023 0.034 -0.069 0.028
Fiscal 
instrument
Full sample (CAPB with Expans.)Full sample (CAPB) Sub-sample (CAPB) Sub-sample (Narrative) EMU (CAPB) Non-EMU (CAPB)
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Appendix 3 – Case study: Portugal 
 
In Table A3 and in Figure A, as an illustration, we summarise the several fiscal episodes that 
occurred in the case of Portugal. The following analysis focuses more on the 1980s, namely 
during the period of external intervention, which is referred to in the literature as being an 
example of a non-keynesian period. 
 
Table A3 – Fiscal Episodes and non-keynesian effects in Portugal (1965-2017) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: E – Fiscal Expansions; C – Consolidations; RE – Recessive Expansions; EC – Expansionary Consolidations 
NKE are episodes where: i) the average real GDP growth during the two years after the fiscal contraction is greater 
than the growth during the two years before, and; ii) the real GDP growth during the two years after the expansions 
is smaller than the average growth during the two years before. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1965-1982 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Fiscal Episodes E E E E E E C
CAPB 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.9 3.3 1.8 0.0 0.6 -1.3 -1.3 -1.6 -0.6 -2.5 -2.8 -5.6 -7.2 -3.0
ΔCAPB : 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 -1.5 -1.7 0.6 -1.9 0.0 -0.3 1.0 -1.9 -0.4 -2.7 -1.6 4.2
Real GDP Growth 9.4 4.6 4.2 5.1 2.4 8.5 10.5 10.4 4.9 2.9 -5.1 2.3 6.0 6.2 7.1 4.8 2.2 2.2
NK Episodes RE RE RE RE
1983-2000 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Fiscal Episodes C C E C E E
CAPB -0.3 -1.6 -0.6 3.2 2.5 3.4 3.2 1.4 0.5 2.7 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.2 -0.2 -2.0 -1.0 -1.3
ΔCAPB 2.8 -1.3 1.0 3.9 -0.7 0.9 -0.2 -1.7 -1.0 2.2 -2.6 0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -1.8 1.0 -0.3
Real GDP Growth 1.0 -1.0 1.6 3.3 7.6 5.3 6.6 7.9 3.4 3.1 -0.7 1.5 2.3 3.5 4.4 4.8 3.9 3.8
NK Episodes EC RE RE
2001-2017 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal Episodes E C E C E E C C E C C E
CAPB -2.9 -0.9 -1.0 -3.2 -3.1 -1.4 -0.7 -1.1 -5.9 -8.3 -2.5 1.2 2.1 -0.7 1.0 2.7 0.8
ΔCAPB -1.5 1.9 -0.1 -2.2 0.1 1.7 0.6 -0.4 -4.7 -2.4 5.8 3.6 0.9 -2.8 1.7 1.7 -1.9
Real GDP Growth 1.9 0.8 -0.9 1.8 0.8 1.6 2.5 0.2 -3.0 1.9 -1.8 -4.0 -1.1 0.9 1.8 1.9 2.8
NK Episodes RE EC RE EC EC
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Figure A: Real GDP growth and budget balance (left axis, % GDP) and unemployment 
rate (right axis) (1960-2017) 
 
 
During the early 1980’s, Portugal faced persistent high budget deficits (attaining values 
above 11 p.p. of GDP), which were not fully offset by the impact on economic growth, which 
revealed weak growth rates in real terms (which were boosted by the application of monetary 
measures). This seems to have led to an increase of the debt ratio from year to year, 
accompanied by both a rise in inflation and difficulties in sovereign financing (see Figure B).  
 
Figure B: Current account, interest expenses (% GDP), and inflation rate (CPI) 
(1960-2017) 
 
Source: AMECO and OECD. 
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In this framework, and following the 1979 oil shock, Portugal was forced to apply a more 
restrictive fiscal policy and had to request external interventional, signing the second Stability 
Programme with the IMF, in order to control the public accounts, reduce inflation, and correct 
the current account imbalances. Later, in 1986, after the introduction of VAT (Value Added 
Tax) and a tax on petroleum products, a strong increase in tax revenue was observed. 
The resulting of the joint impact of this fiscal consolidation and Portugal’s accession to the 
EEC (European Economic Community), strong economic growth was experienced in January 
1986, which was simultaneous with a budget deficit decrease (from 9.2% of GDP in 1985, to 
2.1% in 1989) and also a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio of 3.8 p.p.. Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) called this a “stop and go” episode (Figure C). 
Thus, with favourable stock-flow adjustments arising from the privatisation programme, the 
correction of external imbalances, reductions in the sovereign interest rate, an increase in 
competitiveness, and also a currency devaluation, Portugal appeared to have achieved an 
economic recovery. However, in spite of the reduction in public expenditure, the compensation 
of employees in the public sector presented an increasing trend (Afonso, 2001). As a result, 
since the fiscal consolidation, Portugal experienced a reduction in unemployment (Figure D), 
an increase in private demand (both in private consumption and in investment), and an increase 
in the potential output growth rate.  
 
Figure C: Balance, real GDP growth (left axis), and gross public debt (right axis) 
(% GDP, 1960-2017) 
 
Source: AMECO. 
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The 1986 expansionary consolidation is often referred to in the literature as being an example 
of a non-keynesian episode.  
Lastly, the recent years of 2015-2016 could, in effect, be new examples of expansionist 
consolidations, where, benefiting from expansionary monetary policies and a positive 
international conjuncture, Portugal recorded robust economic growth and a strong decrease in 
the unemployment rate.  
 
 
Figure D: Unemployment rate (left axis) real ULC5 and Final Demand (% GDP) (right 
axis) (1960-2017) 
 
 
Source: AMECO. 
 
                                                             
5 Ratio of compensation per employee to nominal GDP per person employed. 
